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TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AD VALOREM TAXES
ON ANNUITIES ARISING OUT OF INSURANCE POLICIES
IN KENTUCKY
The controversial issue of the taxability of annuities arising
out of insurance as property was placed squarely before the Ken-
tucky Court in Button v. Hikes.' There the deceased left a sum
in money arising from an insurance policy, a minimum rate of
interest and dividends on the principal payable to the taxpayer
annually for life. Under the terms of the policy, the taxpayer
could not commute, assign, alienate, anticipate or pledge the an-
nual payments. The right of the taxpayer to the annual proceeds
was assessed for taxation at a value based on life expectancy
tables. The court held that the right to such payments was not
taxable under constitutional and statutory provisions subjecting
"all property" to assessment - and taxation' at a specified rate.'
The Court placed great weight upon legislative and executive
construction of existing and previous statutes and constitutional
provisions. It was asserted that this construction of existing and
similar provisions in previous constitutions and statutes was that
the right to annual income arising from insurance policies was not
property within the contemplation of the legislature and the
drafters of the Constitution. The reasoning of the Court was that
since the legislature and the drafters of the Constitution had known
that the right to annuities arising from insurance had not been
construed as property' and had failed to expressly include it as
such, that particular right was not intended to be included as prop-
erty. The Court also gave prior legislative and executive con-
struction of existing statutes and constitutional provisions consid-
erable weight, thereby concluding that the right to annuities
arising out of insurance policies was not property within the
meaning of such constitutional and statutory provisions.
The rules applied by the Court are proper rules of statutory
and constitutional construction. Their application, however, seems
questionable in the principal case. It was held in Martin v. High
Splint Coal Company' that the legislature cannot exempt any prop-
erty from ad valorem taxation aside from that expressly excluded
by the Kentucky Constitution. Section 170 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution is to the same effect. The right in question is not so
exempt. It would seem, therefore, that the intention of the legisla-
ture not to include the right to annuities arising from insurance
policies should have no effect as far as taxing statutes are con-
1296 Ky. 163, 176 S. W. 2d 112 (1943).
" Ky. CONST. sec. 172; Ky. R. S. 132.190 (3).
" KY. CONST. sec. 174; Ky. R. S. 132.190 (1) (b).
'KY. R. S. 132.010.
'Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N. E. 727, 729 (1896).6268 Ky. 11, 103 S. W. 2d 711 (1931).
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cerned. The construction of pertinent constitutional provisions
should be controlling.
Executive and legislative construction need not be followed
where clearly erroneous Conceding for the purposes of discussion
that the right to insurance annuities is a property right, that right
would seem to fall within the express provisions of the Constitution
pertaining to the taxation of property. Section 174 provides that
"all property . . . shall be taxed in proportion to its value""
while section 172 directs the assessment of all property "not ex-
empted by this Constitution."9  It is further provided therein that
all laws exempting property not exempted by the Constitution shall
be void' These provisions are clear and explicit in their terms
and evidence an intention to tax all personal property.u If the right
in question is a property right as determined by the courts, it would
seem that legislative and executive construction of these constitu-
tional provisions should be no basis for denying taxability in the
face of the unequivocal terms of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Kentucky Court held in Commonwealth v. Travelers Insur-
ance Machine Company2 that only rights enforceable by the courts
are taxable as personal property. Thus it would seem that where
the acquisition of the right is uncertain or based upon a contingency,
it cannot be taxed as a property right. However, where the right
is vested in the party, and is enforceable during his lifetime only,
it is generally regarded as a property right subject to taxation.
In spite of this general rule, two jurisdictions feel that such rights
are contingent and not taxable as property.' The exponents of this
view point out that there is no immediate right which can be
asserted and that the right is contingent upon the beneficiary's liv-
ing. Therefore, there is no present right which can become the
subject of taxation. This view is untenable. An annual income
for life to which one has an enforceable right is taxed on the imme-
diate right based on the present value. The right is existing at the
time of assessment and certainly has some value. The contention
that such a right is contingent and not taxable as property could
'City of Fulton v. Shanklin, 275 Ky. 772, 122 S. W. 2d 733 (1939).
'KY. CONST. sec. 174.
'KY. CONST. sec. 172.
1 9KY. CONST. sec. 170.
"People v. Wilson Car Lines, 369 Ill. 294, 16 N. E. 2d 752 (1938).
181 Ky. 596, 205 S. W. 561 (1918).
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19 (1938); Evans
v. Boyle County Board of Sup'rs, 296 Ky. 353, 177 S. W. 2d 137
(1944); Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe, 283 Ky. 274,
140 S. W. 2d 1028 (1940); second appeal in the name of Common-
wealth ex rel Reeves v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky. 809, 155 S. W. 2d 243(1941); Commonwealth v. Nute, 115 Ky. 239, 72 S. W.. 1090 (1903);
Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio St. 533, 186 N. E. 392 (1933).1 4 Wellman v. Board of Commissioners of Jewell County, 122
Kan. 229, 252 Pac. 193 (1927); State v. Connell, 31 N. J. L. 374
(1865).
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not stand in Kentucky in view of the decisions in Commonwealth
ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe!' and Evans v. Boyle County Board of
Supervisors' where the court sustained a property tax on annuities
arising out of a trust and a contract respectively. By analogy, an
annuity arising out of an insurance contract, being an enforceable
right to annial payments like rights to annuities arising out of trusts
and other contracts, would seem to constitute property within the
meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to
taxable property.
A possible objection to the taxation of a non-assignable an-
nuity is that its value is not capable of being determined in the
manner provided by the Kentucky Constitution, that is "at its fair
cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary
sale."'  This objection was upheld where constitutions in other
jurisdictions provided that the legislatures should devise methods
of assessment and the legislatures failed to do so.' Since the Ken-
tucky Constitution does not so provide, the use of life expectancy
tables has been resorted to in aiding the assessment of annuities.
This method of assessment was upheld by the Kentucky Court in
an early decision"' and has been approved in recent cases.' The
Court, in Evans v. Boyle County Board of Supervisors,' held that
the constitutional provision as to the manner of assessment was
not mandatory, but rather that it provides the figure at which the
property interest must be assessed, thus leaving the proper methods
of assessment, so as to reach that figure, to the discretion of the
courts. In situations where property interests are incumbered as
to power of sale, assignment, etc., the rule is that the figure at
which such property should be assessed is at the value it would
bring at a free voluntary sale if it were free of incumbrances. 2
The above construction of the constitutional provision as to assess-
ment seems reasonable since it is not to be assumed that the drafters
of the constitution intended that property interests should not be
taxed merely because their value cannot be ascertained in the man-
ner provided in view of their peculiar nature or incumbrances.
It has been asserted that property tax on the right to annuities
283 Ky. 274, 140 S. W. 2d 1028 (1940); second appeal in the
name of Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky. 809, 155
S. W. 2d 243 (1941).
"296 Ky. 353, 177 S. W. 2d 137 (1944).
"KY. CONST. sec. 172.
"State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216,
49 N. E. 14 (1898).
"Commonwealth v. Nute, 115 Ky. 239, 72 S. W. 1090 (1903).
County Board of Tax Sup'rs of Jefferson County v. Helm,
297 Ky. 803, 181 S. W. 2d 452 (1944); Commonwealth ex rel. Martin
v. Sutcliffe, 283 Ky. 274, 140 S. W. 2d 1028 (1940); second appeal in
the name of Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky.
809, 155 S. W. 2d 243 (1941).
'Supra note 16.
" Commonwealth v. Nute, 115 Ky. 239, 72 S. W. 1090 (1903).
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is double taxation and contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution in that it is the taking of property
without due process of law.' Double taxation is repugnant to public
policy in Kentucky, where an ad valorem tax is levied upon the
same property for the same period by the same jurisdiction.' The
solution necessarily turns upon whether or not the tax in question
is a tax on the source from which the income is derived since a
property tax on the source is void where the situs is without the
state' and a property tax on the source which has its situs within
the state and has already been taxed by the state for the same period
is against public policy.' A tax on an annuity is a tax on the prop-
erty right belonging to the annuitant and the situs of that right is at
the residence of the annuitant.' The right to the proceeds is a dis-
tinct property interest in itself and a tax on that interest can hardly
be regarded as a tax on the source from which the annual payments
are to be derived. It has been so held as to rights to annual income
arising out of trust, contract, and insurance.
The necessary conclusion is that annuities arising out of in-
surance policies which prohibit assignment, etc. of the proceeds
should be taxable in Kentucky as a property right. The interest
of the annuitant is clearly property under recent decisions taxing
similar rights and in view of the express language of the Kentucky
Constitution and statutes should become taxable as such. The use
of life expectancy tables in assessing value is proper, and since the
tax is on a property right distinct and independent in itself, the
tax does not subject the owner to double taxation. Such a result
seems socially undesirable in that the source is diminished while
at the same time a burden is being placed upon the income, thus
giving the effect of double taxation. The proper remedy is a con-
stitutional amendment or suitable legislation.
CLEON KILMER COMBS
Brown, The Taxation of Trust Property (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 403.
" Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 656 (1883).
1 Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 656 (1883).
Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe, 283 Ky. 274, 140
S. W. 2d 1028 (1940).
2" Commonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcliffe, 283 Ky. 274, 140
S. W. 2d 1028 (1940); second appeal in the name of Commonwealth
ex rel. Reeves v. Sutcliffe, 287 Ky. 809, 155 S. W. 2d 243 (1941);
Hunt v. Perry, 163 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896); Rowe v. Braden,
126 Ohio St. 533, 186 N. E. 392 (1933).
"Evans v. Boyle County Board of Sup'rs, 296 Ky. 353, 177
S. W. 2d 137 (1944); Commonwealth v. Nute, 115 Ky. 239, 72 S. W.
1090 (1903); Wetmore v. State, 18 Ohio 77 (1849).
"' County Board of Tax Sup'rs of Jefferson County v. Helm,
297 Ky. 803, 181 S. W. 2d 452 (1944).
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